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TOTALITY OF THE SUSPICIOUS
CIRCUMSTANCES: AIRPORT DRUG COURIER
PROFILE USE IN MASSACHUSETTS SINCE
COMMONWEALTH v. TORRES 1
I. INTRODUCTION
A drug courier profile can best be described as an informally
compiled abstract of characteristics thought typical of persons carrying
illicit drugs. 2 Law enforcement agents often use profiles to identify potential airline drug traffickers. 3 The officer typically identifies a suspect
who matches one or more profile characteristics in order to ask them a
few questions.4 If the person consents, the officer will usually ask to see
their airline ticket.5 The ticket contains a great deal of information.6
This information, in combination with the suspect's reaction to the inquiry, can provide a basis for further inquiry or termination of
encounter.7
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches
and seizures.0 Courts determine the reasonableness of a seizure by bal1424 Mass. 153, 674 N.E.2d 314, 316 (1985).
2See

United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547 (1980) (airport drug courier

stopped and questioned by DEA agents leads to characteristic profile arrest).
3
See id. (providing example of common profile factors).
4 See id. (describing actual encounter characteristic of many such stops).
s See id. (noting officer asked for ticket as readily available source of identification).

6

See Brief for the Petitioner at 7, Mendenhall (No. 78-1821) (1979) (describing

identifying information taken off plane ticket of Mendenhall).
7 See id. (stating how ticket information can provide valuable data); Charles L.
Becton, The Drug Courier Profile: All Seems Infected That th' Infected Spy, as All Looks
Yellow to the Jaundic'dEye, 65 N.C. L. REV. 417, 428 (1987) (informing that officers
will asks questions designed to reveal travel discrepancies or suspicious information).
s U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides, in pertinent part:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
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ancing any superior government interest against invasion of the individual's privacy. 9 To justify a seizure, one must have the foundation of
probable cause, and for a lesser pat-frisk type search, reasonable suspicion is a minimum.10 Federal law states that such a seizure, even under
reasonable suspicion, must be based on a totality of the circumstances at
the time of the encounter." Federal courts have further held, even if
drug courier profiles contain factors that are circumstantial and individually innocent, the reasonableness analysis does not change, and such
of the circumstances argument
factors may be used as part of a totality
2
leading to a proper search or seizure.'
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court interprets Massachusetts' Article 14 of the Declaration of Rights as providing greater protection to its citizens than does the Fourth Amendment. 3 The case of
' See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 (1981) (declaring warrantless
searches and seizures unreasonable and subject to rebuttable presumption); Dunaway v.
New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979) (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
176 (1949)) (supporting balancing test between individual privacy and effective law
enforcement when determining probable cause). Justice Brennan in Dunaway paraphrased Brinegarand set out the balance as: "The 'long-prevailing standards' of probable cause embodied 'the best compromise that has been found for accommodating [the]
often opposing interests' in '[safeguarding] citizens from rash and unreasonable interference with privacy' and in '[seeking] to give fair leeway for enforcing the law in the
community's protection."' Id.
"See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925) (stating most common
definition of probable cause). As defined by the Carroll court: Probable cause exists
where "the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they
had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man
of reasonable caution in the belief that "an offense has been or is being committed." Id.
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (defining special category of less intrusive
Fourth Amendment seizures that require only reasonable suspicion).
" See Ohio v. Robinnette, 519 U.S. 33, 38 (1996) (affirming long held position
that Fourth Amendment's touchstone is reasonableness). The Robinnene Court further
measured reasonableness in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances. Id. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,417 (1981) (calling for requirement to use totality of circumstances test). The Cortez Court ruled that in evaluating the
propriety of a stop, it must consider the totality of the circumstances - the whole picture.
Id.
2 See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11 (1989) (also describing other fed-

eral decisions).
"See Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 376 Mass. 349, 358, 380 N.E.2d 669, 674 (1978)
(recognizing Massachusetts Constitution affords greater protections than Fourth
Amendment). Judge Liacos specifically footnoted to Article 14 in the Massachusetts
Constitution when distinguishing the two documents. Id. at 358 n.9. See District Attorney for the Plymouth Dist. v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 379 Mass. 586, 589, 399
N.E.2d 866, 867 (1980) (acknowledging court's ability to adopt more restrictive guidelines under Article 14 than Fourth Amendment).
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Commonwealth v. Torres14 provides that an officer may not add up innocent factors to reach reasonable suspicion to conduct a pat frisk. 5 This
holding places Massachusetts squarely against federal law.' 6 Drug courier profile observations are almost exclusively innocent if analyzed
separately.' 7 Requiring an individual analysis of each factor ignores the
reality that their potency stems from viewing the whole picture.' 8 Opponents have offered proposals to reduce drug courier profiles to a rigid set
of criteria, but drug couriers would adapt their behavior to avoid detection.' 9 In Massachusetts, allowing experienced police officers to draw
common sense conclusions amounting to reasonable suspicion, even
from apparently innocent behaviors, does not offend logic because a
whole is often more than the sum of its parts. 20

1, 424 Mass. 153, 164, 674 N.E.2d 638, 646 (1997).
16

id.

I6Compare Torres, 424 Mass. at 161, 674 N.E.2d at 643-44 (holding innocent
factors may not be added up to reach reasonable suspicion), with Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 11
(allowing for innocent factors to make up analysis leading to reasonable suspicion).
7
1 See Commonwealth v. Fraser, 410 Mass 541, 545, 573 N.E.2d 979,982 (1991)
(stating factors in determining reasonable suspicion are each innocent themselves);
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 5-6 (describing seemingly innocent factors that give rise to permissible suspicion depending on context). The factors include, but are not limited to, cash
payment for tickets, unchecked baggage, use of an alias, type of dress, length of stay,
destination city, origin city, nervous appearance, and type of movement through airport.

Id.
Is See United States v. Caicedo, 85 F.3d 1184, 1189 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating no
single factor is common to all drug interdiction encounters at airports). Other courts
have recognized that one factor in isolation does not meet the requirement of reasonable
articulable suspicion. Id. at 1189 (quoting United States v. Knox, 839 F.2d 285, 290 (6th
Cir. 1988)). See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,417 (1981) (deciding that in
evaluating stops, like drug profile stops, court must consider totality of circumstances).
t9
See United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1086, 1101 (E.D.N.Y. 1971)
(announcing validity of anti-hijacker profile based on rigid scientific testing). This profile has been limited to exact matches, and the change of just one factor calls for a rejection of the conclusion drawn by the person applying the profile to a suspect. Id. See also
Karnes v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485, 489-90 (3d Cir. 1995) (recognizing profile as dynamic
and changing which adapt when drug couriers change their behaviors); Stephen E. Hall,
A BalancingApproach to the Constitutionalityof Drug CourierProfiles, 1993 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1007, 1010 (1993) (calling for objectively codified drug courier profile).
2' See generally Sokolow, 490 U.S. I. The Court specifically rejected any bright
line test of a profile. Id. The Court further equated a police officer's ability to deduce
suspicion based on common sense factors to that of a jury's role in reaching factual conclusions based on common sense human behaviors. Id. It is entirely permissible for an
officer to reach a conclusion amounting to reasonable suspicion based solely on innocent
factors. Id. at 8- 10.
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This Note addresses the drug courier profile and the dichotomy
between federal and Massachusetts search and seizure protections. 21 Part
II of the Note outlines the history of the drug courier profile. 22 This section also describes the elements of federal and Massachusetts search and
seizure protection. 23 Part III of the Note analyzes the two levels of search
and seizure protection. 24 Part IV of the Note examines proposals made to
improve the use of drug courier profiles. 25 The Note concludes by recognizing the importance of the drug courier profile and suggesting the
Massachusetts level of protection may be too high. 26

II. HISTORY
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. 27 With limited
exceptions, a reasonable seizure must have the support of a warrant
based on a showing of probable cause. 28 A stop made pursuant to a drug
courier profile is not necessarily a seizure. 29 The Supreme Court held
21See

supra notes 1-20 and accompanying text.
22See infra notes 27-83 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 84-131 and accompanying text.
2"See infra notes 132-146 and accompanying text.
24
See infra notes 147-168 and accompanying text.
2See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
27

See supra note 8 (citing applicable text of Constitution).

25 See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 (1981) (declaring warrantless
searches unreasonable subject to rebuttable presumption).
See Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440 (1980); Florida v. Bostik, 501 U.S. 429,

431 (1991); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 506 (1983). Not every encounter is necessarily a seizure. Reid, 448 U.S. at 440. There are encounters where the individual does
not respond or answer questions and this does not rise to a Fourth Amendment seizure.
Id. In Reid, police observed two men deplane in the early morning when police activity
is low. Id. They both were carrying identical shoulder bags. Id. at 400. They glanced at
each other as they walked to the building exit. Id. Agents outside approached and began
to question the men. Id. They provided their airline tickets after the officers identified
themselves as narcotics officers. Id. One of the men ran away, abandoning his shoulder
bag, which contained drugs. Id. See Mendenhall, 446 U. S. at 554 (acknowledging need
for police questioning as valid investigatory tool for prosecution of crimes). This practice has been expanded to allow for police to randomly approach persons in airports to
ask them questions as long as a reasonable person would not feel that they were forced to
cooperate. Bostik, 501 U.S. at 431. See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (Powell J., concurring) (recognizing that police are not prevented from approaching and questioning people on streets).
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that stopping an individual under circumstances where a reasonable person would not feel free to leave constitutes a seizure.30 Courts remedy
unreasonable seizures by the judicially created exclusionary rule. 31 The
exclusionary rule is a judicial order barring the admission of evidence
obtained as a result of the personal privacy infraction.32 This is not a
constitutionally mandated remedy, but a practical measure aimed at deterrence to future unlawful searches and seizures.33 When a government
interest outweighs the intrusiveness of the seizure, the seizure is consti34
tutional, and the fruits of the search are admissible as evidence of guilt.
The constitutional landscape dramatically changed in 1968 with
the landmark Supreme Court case of Terry v. Ohio.35 The Court permit3o Bostik,

501 U.S. 429 (holding no seizure occurred). In Bostik, two officers dis-

playing their badges boarded a bus without suspicion and asked a passenger's consent to
inspect his luggage. Id. at 431. The passenger consented, and the police found cocaine.
Id. The Court declared the required Fourth Amendment analysis centered on whether a
reasonable person would have felt free to decline the officers' requests and walk away.
Id. For Fourth Amendment purposes, the Court declared the government had not seized
Bostik when he consented to a search. Id. at 438. This case redefined the parameters of
a stop to include a situation where an individual did not feel free to walk away or otherwise end the encounter as a seizure. Id. at 438. See Reid, 448 U.S. at 440 (declaring
seizure by police). See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,506 (1983) (holding seizure
occurred when policed moved defendant over 40 feet from encounter spot). In Royer,
two detectives stopped a suspect who fit a drug courier profile. Id. at 494. He produced
an airline ticket and driver's license without his oral consent. Id. Without returning his
property, the officers asked him to accompany them 40 feet away to a small room. Id.
The Court determined this was a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. Id. at 508.
An arrest of an individual, by placing in physical control or custody of an officer, is
considered a seizure as well. Id.
31See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (declaring exclusionary rule deterrent necessary to give Fourth Amendment practical effect).
See id. (outlining seminal case defining exclusionary rule).
3 See id. (creating theoretical future deterrent to unlawful police conduct by eliminating present evidence).
" See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967) (recognizing government interest in cases of municipal building inspections that needed support of probable
cause). Without probable cause, the search would be unreasonable and prohibited. Id.
See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28 (expanding policy into police encounters where
superior governmental interest is police officer's safety).
35392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, a police officer observed two males casing a business store. Id. at 4. The officer approached the males and asked them questions. Id. at
4. Fearing for his safety, the officer patted down the outside of their clothing and unmistakably felt a gun, which he seized. Id. at 4. The Supreme Court declared the action
a search without probable cause, but allowed it because it was much less intrusive than a
full-scale search of a person and justified based on the officer's articulable suspicions of
the two men and his fear for his personal safety. Id. at 30.
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36
ted a lesser pat-frisk search, now commonly referred to as a Terry stop.
Police safety, the superior government interest in Terry, provides the
foundation for the Court's analysis of individual elements in drug courier
profile cases.
Similar to the federal government approach, Massachusetts law
enforcement agents also use drug courier profiles.37 The concept of drug
courier profiles came out of a necessity to fight an emerging war on
drugs. 38 The United States and Massachusetts remain in a war against
drugs. 39 This war in the United States has escalated, leading to the appointment of a military commander as Federal Drug Czar along with the
establishment of specialty drug courts. 4°
The collective police knowledge now includes methods of drug
trafficking because of intelligence gathered from known and convicted
41
couriers.
Police also know that drugs continue to make their way

36

See WAYNE

AMENDMENT,

stop).

R.

LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:

A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
at 348 (2d ed. 1987) (recognizing acceptance of colloquial use of Terry

. 7 See generally Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 153, 674 N.E.2d 638 (1997);

Commonwealth v. Bartlett, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 468, 671 N.E.2d 515 (1996); Commonwealth v. Rivera, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 311, 599 N.E.2d 245 (1992); Commonwealth v.
Gutierrez, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 42, 43, 522 N.E.2d 1002, 1003 (1988) (detailing typical
drug courier profile case in Massachusetts).
38 See United States v. Ehlebracht, 693 F.2d 333, 335 n.3 (former 5th Cir. 1982)
(detailing massive amount of drug cases in courts). Drug Enforcement Agent Paul
Markonni (sic) is largely credited with providing the work behind the term as early as
1974. United States v. McClain, 452 F. Supp. 195, 199 (E.D. Mich. 1977). In 1977, he
testified that the DEA was having difficulty in the identification of suspects because of a
vast lack of information. Id. He had years of experience and began recognizing patterns
he saw in couriers. Id. See Brian A. Wilson, The War on Drugs: Evening the Odds
Through Use of the Airport Drug CourierProfile, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 203, 203 n.1
(1996) (recognizing drug epidemic leading up to and including 1978).
3

9 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE SOURCEBOOK OF

CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1994, at 413 (1995) (summarizing astonishing amount of
money funded to fight drug trade). In 1995, the U.S. spent over $13 billion combating
the drug trade representing a $10 billion increase from 1985. Id.
4oSee Editorial, BOSTON GLOBE, Strategic Thinking About Drugs, March 11, 1996,
at 10 (announcing appointment of Barry McCaffrey as national drug czar); White House
Press Office, U.S. NEWSWIRE, White House Fact Sheet on Initiatives to break Cycle of
Crime and Drugs, January 5, 1999 (outlining President Clinton's intent to increase number of local drug courts). The number of drug courts has increased from 12 in 1994 to
over 400 in 1999. Id.
" See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 525 (1983) (Rehniquist, J., dissenting) (recognizing police training relies on collective experience of law enforcement officers).
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through airports because it remains a successful conduit. 42

Far more

drugs make it through the governmental screening process than are detected.43 Through training and intelligence gathering, officers become
skilled in recognizing patterns and behaviors of drug couriers. 44 Law
enforcement agencies informally collect and disseminate behaviors,
physical attributes and methods of drug traffickers with each other.45
Agencies develop profiles, which they use to enable officers to increase
the probability of
detection and to distinguish drug couriers from ordi46
nary passengers.

The airport is a significant entry point of illegal narcotics into the
commerce. 47 Therefore, the most innovative and effective methods of
48
drug interdiction are brought to bear on the front lines: the airports.
Law enforcement officers developed the drug courier profile to help sift
myriad of innocent travelers to identify suspected
through the
49
criminals.

A. FederalLaw
After the Supreme Court settled the question of what constitutes a
seizure pursuant to a drug courier profile and set the guidelines for reasonableness, another question surfaced. 50 In applying the reasonable
42See id. at

508 (Justice Powell concurring that air transportation is preferred

method of drug trafficking).
4 See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 561-62 (1980) (acknowledging
highly sophisticated methods used by drug traffickers and ease of drug concealment).
"See Wilson, supra note 38 at 241 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 n.2
(1979)) (noting police officers may become highly skilled in drug courier activity).

See id. at 205 (recognizing practice of sharing police intelligence information).
See generally Royer, 460 U.S. at 492-93 (commenting on use of drug courier
profiles as law enforcement method to stop illegal drug activity).
41 See id. at 508 (Powell, J. concurring) (recognizing extent
to which air transportation is used in drug trafficking).
"See id. at 508-09 (recognizing airports as major commerce stream of illegal narcotics). Justice Powell noted that since 1974 the DEA has adopted the practice of assigning highly skilled agents to the major airports as part of a nationwide program to
intercept drug couriers. Id.
'9See United States v. Ehlebracht, 693 F.2d 333, 335 n.3 (former 5th Cir. 1982)
(referring to foundations and creation of drug courier profile).
',
See Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440 (1980) (setting parameters for seizures
in drug courier cases). This opinion focused mainly on probable cause and the objective
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suspicion requirement developed in Terry, the Supreme Court in Reid v.
Georgia,51 determined that a DEA agent could not have reasonably suspected a defendant of drug courier activity based on his profile.52 While
limiting its holding to the specific profile and facts of the case, the Court
nonetheless condemned the use of profiles to match suspicious behaviors
and observations as no more than a hunch.53 Therefore the question remains: Could a54drug courier profile ever justify a conclusion of reasonable suspicion?
Three years later, the Supreme Court seemed to deal the profile
practice another blow.55 In Florida v. Royer,56 the lower court held that
the Royer stop amounted to more than a Terry type detainment and
overturned the conviction.5 7 In determining that his behavior remained
consistent with the drug courier profile, the Court found the initialRoyer
stop probably would have been reasonable. 58 The Royer court recognized that law enforcement officers are free to push the limits of the
standard that a seizure occurs when a person would not feel free to leave or otherwise
terminate the encounter. Id.
" 448 U.S. 438 (1980).
62 See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8 (1968) (creating
"reasonable suspicion" standard to frisk); Reid, 448 U.S. at 438, 441 (citing that Reid's behavior was too
common to be criminally suspicious). As Reid and his companion passed through the
airport, he sporadically looked behind him and when his partner met up with him the two
spoke briefly before attempting to leave the airport. Id. Upon questioning by DEA
agents, Reid attempted to flee, but the agents apprehended him and found cocaine. Id.
'3 See Reid, 448 U.S. at 440 (citing specific observations as no more than police
hunches). The majority felt that a seizure had occurred without probable cause. Id. The
court chastised the police officer's belief that Reid and his companion were trying to
avoid detection and conceal that they were travelling together based on their actions was
"too slender a reed to support the seizure." Id.

" See generally id. (holding drug courier profile failed to amount to reasonable
suspicion here without additional clarification).
66See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 506 (1983) (noting conviction overturned).
Officers held Royer too long and his seizure was held an arrest without supporting probable cause. Id.
" 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
7
, See id. Compare Royer, 460 U.S. at 499 (noting defendants
were moved to another location) with Terry, 392 U.S. at 10 (noting defendants were frisked in place).
"See Royer 460 U.S. at 502 (announcing that asking defendant to move some 40
feet away as too invasive). The officers changed the circumstances of the initial stop by
asking Royer to come with them to a closed room some 40 feet away while holding onto
his license and airline ticket. Id. at 502. This created a situation, in the Court's opinion,
that a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave. Id. Therefore, the police were
required to have probable cause to justify the seizure of Royer, which was lacking at that
point in the encounter. Id.

20001

AIRPORT DRUG COURIER PROFILE

Constitution and the Fourth Amendment so long as they do not exceed
the bounds. 59 After acknowledging the initial stop valid, the Court further ruled that observations amounting to a drug courier profile contain
too many different possibilities to attempt to reduce them to a finite formula. 6° Without requiring profiles to meet a rigid formula, the Supreme
Court signaled its preference of reasonableness over rigid guidelines. 6'
In the most recent case on point, the Court established clear guidance on the acceptable use of drug courier profiles.62 In United States v.
Sokolow, 63 the Court held that drug courier profile cases must be decided
using a totality of the circumstances approach to the facts known to the
officers at the time of the stop. 64 The Court's decision overturned the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal's ruling of the same case that called for a
two-part analysis. 65 The court of appeals stated that reasonable suspicion
should be based upon evidence of ongoing criminal behavior on one
hand, and on probabilistic evidence on the other.6s The Court, noting one

r9 See Royer, 460 U.S. at 519 (Blackman, J., dissenting) (recognizing clear need
for flexibility in methods of finding illicit drug couriers).
60 See id. at 506-07. The Court stated:
We do not suggest that there is a litmus-paper test for distinguishing a
consensual encounter from a seizure or for determining when a seizure exceeds the bounds of an investigative stop. Even in the discrete category of
airport encounters, there will be endless variations in the facts and circumstances, so much variation that it is unlikely that the courts can reduce
to a sentence or a paragraph a rule that will provide unarguable answers to
the question whether there has been an unreasonable search or seizure in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Id.
61

See id. at 509 (limiting holding of case to present facts only).

6 See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 3-5 (1989) (defining parameters of
permissive drug courier profile use). Drug Enforcement Administration agents in the
Honolulu International Airport stopped Andrew Sokolow. Id. at 4. In his luggage police
discovered 1,063 grams of cocaine. Id. The agents knew at the time he was stopped
that: (1) he paid for two tickets (over $2000) in $20 bills, (2) he was travelling under a
different name, (3) he was coming from Miami, (4) he had left Hawaii went to Miami
and stayed 48 hours before returning to Hawaii, (5) he was nervous, and (6) he did not
check any of his luggage. Id. The Court's concern centered on whether the agents had
reasonable suspicion that Sokolow's behaviors indicated ongoing criminal behavior. Id.
at 7.
490 U.S. 1 (1989).
See id. at 13-14 (returning analysis to totality test).
See id. at 7 (citing Ninth Circuit's ruling).
See id. at 6 (detailing improper two-part test of lower court).
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reason for overturning the Ninth Circuit, specifically rejected splitting
the evidence into two categories.67
More consequential to the issue of drug courier profiles, the Court
codified the current federal analysis in Sokolow by declaring that the use
of drug courier profiles does not change the process to reach reasonable
suspicion.68 In a common sense approach to the question, the Court
sifted out the weight of catchphrases such as "drug courier profile" and
"collection of factors" finding them irrelevant. 69 The Court's concern
was with the reasonableness of the stop itself, not the nickname. 70 The
Court held that even if circumstantial evidence leads to reasonable suspicion the stops are still permissible. 71 Recognizing the human element of
these types of encounters, the Court further stated that common sense
conclusions about human behavior are permissible.72 The Court quoted
its holding in Gates and stated that, "[innocent behavior will frequently
provide the basis for a showing of probable cause ... [i]n making determinations of probable cause the relevant inquiry is not whether the particular conduct is 'innocent' or 'guilty,' but the degree of suspicion that
attaches to particular types of non-criminal acts. 73 This ruling allows a
wide range of permissible activity for profile use. 74

67

See id. at 7-8 (correcting Ninth Circuit's restrictive analysis).

See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 19 (deciding drug courier profiles are permissive when
used as part of normal reasonable suspicion analysis). The opinion specifically states,
"We do not agree that our (reasonable suspicion) analysis is somehow changed by the
agents' belief that his (Sokolow's) behavior was consistent with. .. 'drug courier profiles."' Id.
69See id. (minimizing impact of word profile to focus attention to analysis itself).
See id. (downplaying word choice in favor of actual analysis).
id. at 7-8 n.6. (approving DEA had routinely trained its agents to identify
drug smugglers through circumstantial evidence). The Court noted that there might be
occasions that wholly lawful conduct could give rise to reasonable suspicion. Id. at 17.
The Court also noted it possible to have a series of acts that are each innocent, but when
taken together warrant further investigation. Id.
72 See id. at 8 (recognizing human element of police decisions). The Court reiter70

71See

ated that the process of determining probable cause deals in probabilities and allows for
common-sense conclusions about human behavior. Id.
"Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 18 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243-44
(1983)).
7, See Hall, supra note 19 at 1008 (noting Sokolow allows for subjective judgement
of reasonable suspicion of suspect by officer). The determination permits a wide variety
of permissible uses. It allows for a subjective conclusion based on an individual's commonsense. Similarly, jurors bring their own personal backgrounds and experience into
the courtroom to determine facts and draw conclusions. Id.
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The Sokolow decision has its limitations.75 The Sokolow standard
places a great deal of importance on the specifics of an officer's testi76
An officer must be able to articulate the factors
mony and conduct.
leading to his conclusion of reasonable suspicion, and not simply state
that the suspect fit the profile." Prosecutors meet this burden by proper
direct examination of the officer. 78 A solid examination directs officers
to point to the specific aspects of the defendant's behavior, manner and
dress that led to the reasonable suspicion conclusion.79 Conversely, a
defense attorney's opportunity lies in the cross-examination. 80 Exploitation of the observations in minute detail, and the subjective conclusions
drawn from them could paint a picture of a faltering decision. 8 ' By attempting to draw the officer into stating that he made broad generalizations or a hasty decision, a skilled cross-examiner can impeach the credibility of both the officer and the profile.8 2 These trial tactics are both
permissible and probable.83

76 See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 (1989) (granting certiorari solely to refocus attention
to Fourth Amendment's requirement for reasonableness).
76See id. (calling for specific articulable facts by officer).

77See id. (noting use of the word profile does not itself provide sufficient case specific facts).
78

See Hall, supra note 19 at 1010 (pointing to examples of testimony where officer
must articulate).
" See id. (recognizing officer's judgment is relied upon heavily by court given
his/her experience).
" See id. (inferring government weakness lies in making general observations indicative of no particular criminal). Hall warns of the danger in allowing the same person
who made the stop to assist in the contemplation of the reasonableness of the stop as
well. Id. There is an inherent question raised of a risk of police abuse, and a skillful
defense attorney will exploit this weakness if presented. Id.
0'See id. (recognizing profile effectiveness stems from officer's personal experiences as well as observable factors). Hall infers that a hunch is easily created by personalizing every observation made to an officer's inferior and subjective views of human
behavior. Id.
2.See id. at 1023 (recognizing short time in which officers must make decisions).
There is a stark difference between the analysis of the officer's decision made in the
airport and the analysis made in the courtroom. Id.
" See United States v. Taylor, 917 F.2d. 1402, 1408-09 (6th Cir. 1990) (exemplifying case of hasty generalizations by officer). The defense attorney in Taylor provides
a solid example of discrediting a police officer on drug courier profiles:
Q: Have you ever had any formal training in what constitutes a drug (courier) profile... If so, tell me when and who taught you?
A: Well, I - naw, I tell you, when you get into the word profile, I think
we're starting to learn that there's no really (sic) criteria that you can actually say, yeah, hey, that is a druggy...
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B. MassachusettsState Law
Historically, Massachusetts has conflicted with the Supreme
Court concerning constitutional interpretation."4 The philosophical differences surrounding this issue are sheltered in the affirmation that the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights is more restrictive than the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 85 The Massachusetts SuQ: All right. Now go ahead now, how did the defendant appear on this occasion?
A: He appeared [in] kind of a grunnchy (sic) type work clothes. He had a
dirty black baseball cap with something wrote (sic) across the front of it,
and little squirrelly, kind of like captains wear, the little gold squirrels
across the bill...
Q: In the military - called scrambled eggs?
A: There you go - scrambled eggs. And he had on, I think it was, a blue
shirt with "PACE" written across the pocket. A pair of blue trousers,
white tennis shoes.
Q: And why do you say he - why did he stick out?
A: Well, the rest of the passengers that usually come from Miami flights is
(sic) either business people or resort type people, people getting off in real
casual nice looking clothes. Like I say, it was just different seeing somebody getting off there looking like Mr. [Taylor] looked that night.
Id. See Louisiana v. Garcia, 519 So. 2d 788, 793 (La. App. 1987) (discussing officers
drug courier testimony and failure of defense counsel to impeach officers' testimony);
See United States v. Quigley, 890 F.2d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 1989) (commenting on officer's expert testimony regarding profiles). The court negatively commented on using an
officer's expert drug courier profile testimony as evidence of guilt. Id. The defense
counsel cross examined the officer on drug courier profiles and attempted to point out
that the defendant did not display the typical accoutrements of wealth associated with
some profiles. Id. The court then allowed the government to introduce other types of
profile testimony to rebut the defense counsel's attack. Id.
" See e.g. Commonwealth v. Upton, 390 Mass. 562, 458 N.E.2d 717 (1983) (rejecting Supreme Court ruling in favor of Massachusetts state constitutional interpretation); Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363,476 N.E.2d 548 (1985) (rejecting again
Supreme Court ruling in favor of its own interpretation).
'5See MASS. CONST. ANN. PT. 1, ART. 14 (1998). Article 14 of the Massachusetts Constitution states:
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and
seizures, of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All
warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of
them be not previously supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order
in the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or to
arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their property, be not accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of search,
arrest, or seizure; and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with
the formalities prescribed by the laws.
Id. See Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 376 Mass. 349, 356, 380 N.E.2d 669, 674 (1978) (distinguishing Article 14 of Massachusetts State Constitution from Fourth Amendment).
Ortiz specifically holds that the SJC interprets Article 14 to provide greater protections
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preme Judicial Court (SJC) has affirmed that Massachusetts provides
more protections to individual freedoms than provided by the U.S. Constitution. 86 In particular, Article Fourteen of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights grants stronger individual rights against unreasonable
search and seizures than the Fourth Amendment.87 Sound legal analysis
requires this judicial position if the intent is to independently distance
Massachusetts law from federal law. 8
Otherwise, the Fourteenth
Amendment provides substantive Due Process implications to the states
and requires states to provide citizens the protections guaranteed under
the United States Constitution. 9
The SJC and the Supreme Court strictly prohibit the use of drug
courier profiles as substantive evidence of guilt.90 Commonwealth v.
Day 91 recognizes this precept for both jurisdictions. 92 The foundations of
Massachusetts law in threshold inquiries and seizures are strikingly
similar to federal law given the disparate outcome in drug courier
cases. 93 For a permissive threshold inquiry, the SIC in Commonwealth v.
than the Fourth Amendment. Id. See District Attorney for the Plymouth District v. New
England Tel. & Tel. Co., 379 Mass. 586, 589 (1980) (agreeing court may grant additional
rights under Article 14 not present in Fourth Amendment).
"See Ortiz, 376 Mass. at 356, 380 N.E.2d at 674 (specifically recognizing differences and greater limitations of Massachusetts law); MASS. CONST. ANN. PT. 1, ART. 14
(textually different than Fourth Amendment); Jenkins v. Chief Justice of the District
Court Dep't, 416 Mass. 221, 229 n.16, 619 N.E.2d 324, 330 (1993). The court stated, "it
is by now firmly established that, in some circumstances, Art.14 affords greater protection against arbitrary government action than do the cognate provisions of the Fourth
Amendment." Id.
87 See MASS. CONST. ANN. PT. 1, ART. 14 (preceding and textually different than
the Fourth Amendment).
8See Upton, 394 Mass. at 364, 476 N.E.2d at 549 (declaring Massachusetts Declaration of Rights is stricter on government intrusions than Fourth Amendment). Indicating a preference over federal law, the SJC later stated in the same opinion: "The
Constitution of the Commonwealth preceded and is independent of the Constitution of
the United States." Id. at 372, 476 N.E.2d at 555-56.
See Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1879) (noting 14'h Amendment
means States shall not deny federal or equal protections of laws). The Constitution gives
power to Congress to enforce its provisions to the states by appropriate legislation. Id.
goSee Commonwealth v. Day, 409 Mass. 719, 723, 569 N.E.2d 397, 399 (1991)
(citing U.S. v. Simpson 910 F.2d 154, 158 (4th Cir. 1990)).
Mass. 719, 569 N.E.2d 397 (1991).
"See id. (recognizing federal prohibition as evidence of guilt and duplicating rule
for Massachusetts).
9"409

NSee e.g. Commonwealth v. Silva, 366 Mass. 402, 406, 318 N.E.2d 895, 898
(1974) (relying on Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1(1968) to explain Massachusetts position on
threshold inquiries); Commonwealth v. Stoute, 422 Mass. 782, 785, 665 N.E.2d 93, 95
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Silva,94 held that, "[T]he police officer's action [must] be based on specific and articulable facts and the specific reasonable inferences which
follow from such facts in light of the officer's experience. '0 5 Once the
threshold inquiry test is satisfied, and if the encounter continues, the next
test is one for seizure.9 6 Massachusetts adheres to the seizure test
adopted in United States v. Mendenhall.97 The Mendenhall test serves to
distinguish a seizure from a consensual encounter by, "[v]iewing all the
circumstances surrounding the incident, [to determine if] a reasonable
person would have believed that he was not free to leave."98 In Commonwealth v. Borges,99 Massachusetts adopted the same test., °°
It is the recent case of Commonwealth v. Torres, that the SJC departed in its interpretation of observations that may lead to reasonable
suspicion.' 0 ' In Torres, a state trooper stopped a vehicle, in which Torres
was a passenger, for a moving violation. 0 2 The trooper approached the
vehicle on the passenger side and waited several seconds for Torres to
notice he was standing outside his window. 0 3 Torres attempted to exit
(1996) (citing foundation United States v. Mendenhall, 466 U.S. 544 (1980), as test Massachusetts will use to determine seizure).
366 Mass. 402, 318 N.E.2d 895 (1974).
See Silva, 366 Mass. at 406, 318 N.E.2d at 898 (recognizing officer's experience
plays role in observing potential criminal situations). By clarifying that an officer's
experience plays a factor in his ability to assess observations, one may infer from the
case that an officer with a great deal of experience with particular types of observations
may draw inferences that inexperienced persons could not. Id.
"See Commonwealth v. Stoute, 422 Mass. 782, 786, 665 N.E.2d 93, 95 (1996)
(defining seizure test in Massachusetts). The court declared for purposes of Article 14, a
person seized when the police have significantly restrained their personal liberty. Id.
,7 See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 550 (1980) (defining federal
"free to leave" standard test for seizures); Commonwealth v. Thinh Van Cao, 419 Mass.
383, 387, 644 N.E.2d 1294, 129'i (1995) (declaring Mendenhall as the standard in Massachusetts). The court recognized that, "Massachusetts courts have adhered to the test
set forth in the Mendenhall (case)... as the proper analysis whether a seizure has occurred under article 14 to the Massachusetts Constitution." Id.
,Mendenhall, 466 U.S. at 554.
393 Mass. 788, 482, N.E.2d 314 (1985).
1

" See id. at 791, 482 N.E.2d at 316 (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554). Officers asked a suspect to remove his shoes during an investigatory stop. Id. This act
taised the stop to a seizure because the court found a reasonable person would not have
felt free to leave without his shoes. Id.
'0'See Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 153, 160, 674 N.E.2d 638, 640 (1997)
(holding each observed factor must independently indicate something suspicious).
'1' See id. at 155, 674 N.E.2d at 641 (citing speed as reason for car stop).
103Id.
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the vehicle, and, fearing for his safety, the trooper directed Torres to wait
at the rear of the vehicle.' °4 The trooper then began to question the
driver outside the vehicle and away from Torres.'0 5 Once the driver answered the trooper's questions satisfactorily, the trooper began to question Torres.1°6 Because Torres repeatedly stated that he did not speak
English, the trooper motioned to Torres' rear pant's pocket to his wallet
and made an open and close motion with his hands.10 7 Torres gave his
wallet to the trooper who, upon inspection, found papers he recognized
as money wire receipts from Lowell, Massachusetts to Medellin, Colombia. 08 Based on his experience and training, the trooper knew Medellin
to be a source city for cocaine distribution.' °9 He requested to search the
vehicle and received permission. 110 The court convicted both the driver
and Torres with trafficking in cocaine, and conspiracy to traffic in cocaine, of which the convictions were later set aside."'
With respect to Torres, the court found the stop impermissible be-2
cause it felt the officer reached reasonable suspicion based on a hunch."
Holding that a passenger in a car has a higher expectation of privacy than
the driver, the court reasoned that upon receiving a set of satisfactory
answers by the driver, the trooper should have presented the driver with a
traffic violation and sent him on his way absent an independent suspicion
of Torres. 13 The court felt that up to this point the trooper had been

1 Id.
1o6Id.

'" Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 153, 156, 674 N.E.2d 638, 641 (1997).
107 id.

log
Id.
109Id.
110

Id.

..Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 153, 156, 674 N.E.2d 638, 641 (1997).
.12
See id. at 158, 674 N.E.2d at 642 (narrowing discussion to areas of reasonable
suspicion to question Torres). The court held that the issue surrounding Torres was
whether there was independent reasonable suspicion to question him while at the back of
the vehicle. Id. at 163, 674 N.E.2d at 645. The facts present a similar circumstance to
many airport drug courier profile observations such as dress, speech, nervousness, and
other circumstances enumerated in the opinion.
..See id. at 158, 674 N.E.2d at 642 (separating passenger and driver's expectation
of privacy). The court stated, "It is well settled that a police inquiry must end on the
production of a valid license and registration unless the police have grounds for inferring
that either the operator or his passengers were involved in the commission of a crime or
engaged in other suspicious conduct." The court signaled that the driver and Torres
should have been sent upon their way with whatever citation could have been issued. Id.
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collecting merely innocent observations indicative of nothing criminal." 4
The SJC specifically drew the analogy of adding up of zeros not equating
to a sum of reasonable suspicion. 1 5 In reaching its decision, the SJC
relied, in part, and devoted considerable space in the opinion to, Commonwealth v. Bartlett,"6 in which it reinforces Bartlett's rejection of another trooper's use of eight factors akin to a profile, as not enough to approach the reasonable stimulus for investigation. 1 7 The Torres court
declared the order of events as the specific reason for the improper
search and seizure, not the questioning itself." 8 Specifically, given the
facts presented above, if the trooper had asked for Torres' identification
first, the stop would have been permissible.11 9 By stating the trooper's
deductions were only out of order, it may be inferred that the SJC does
not say they were improper and therefore, in a similar situation, an offi-

11

See id. at 161, 674 N.E.2d at 643-44 (reversing lower court's position that Tor-

res' actions amounted to suspicion). The lower court ruled that Torres' exiting the passenger side was itself unusual and justified the trooper's suspicion of Torres to ascertain
his identity. Id.
...
See id. at 161-62, 674 N.E.2d at 643-44. (quoting Commonwealth v. Bartlett,
41 Mass. App. Ct. 468, 469-70, 671 N.E.2d 515, 516 (1996)). The Bartlett court identified eight observations made by a police officer and declared, "Adding up eight zeros- does not produce a sum of suspicion..." to justify a Terry stop based on reasonable
suspicion. Bartlett, 41 Mass. App. Ct. at 469-70, 671 N.E.2d at 516. The eight observations were: (1) the car was rented, (2) the car was rented at Logan Airport, (3) the car
was not rented to either the driver or the passenger, (4) the driver was a resident of Cambridge, and it was odd that he would rent a car for a local trip, (5) the driver was driving
from Boston to Lowell and back at 10:00 AM to pick up a carpenter, (6) there were no
construction tools in the car (they had claimed to be construction workers), (7) the occupants of the vehicle wore beepers, and (8) the officer had made drug seizures himself in
the area they were travelling in. Id.
116 41 Mass. App. Ct. 468, 671
N.E.2d 515 (1996)
..
7 Torres, 424 Mass. at 159, 674 N.E.2d at 643-44. In reaching the conclusion
that Torres' actions did not justify further suspicion, the court supports the conclusion
through reliance on Bartlett. Bartlett, 41 Mass. App. Ct. at 469-70, 671 N.E.2d. at 517.
Bartlett declares that the some of the factors are individually unlikely as to suggest guilt,
while others are individually explained away with opposite innocent explanations and
proposals by the court. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Day, 409 Mass. 719, 723, 569
N.E.2d 397, 399 (declaring drug courier profiles can not be used as evidence of guilt).
The Bartlett court did not address whether it concluded that the officer was assessing the
factors to reach reasonable suspicion or determining guilt. Bartlett, 41 Mass. App. Ct. at
468, 671 N.E.2d. at 517.
"' See Torres, 424 Mass. at 163, 674 N.E.2d at 645 (finding questions too invasive). The court agreed with the Appeals Court that, "the order of events is what renders
this search and seizure improper." Id.
"9 See id. (inferring order of questioning led to improper reasonable suspicion).
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cer could permissibly find reasonable suspicion under a totality of the
circumstances argument.' 2°
In Torres, the court relies on another Massachusetts Appeals
Court opinion, Commonwealth v. Rivera.12 ' The Torres opinion seems to
stretch language in Rivera that bears heavily on its conclusion. 22 Specifically, the court quotes Rivera as, "while alert police officers may add
up suggestive factors ... to support a search, they may not add up nonsuggestive factors [emphasis added]."'' 23 The Rivera opinion provides,
"while one factor by itself may appear innocent... taken in combination
with other factors, there may be requisite reasonable apprehension.' 24
Notably absent is the word "suggestive."'12 5 The addition of "suggestive"
by the SJC in Torres changes the foundation of the argument. 26 The
foundation of the argument is that police may add up suggestive but not
innocuous factors in matching observations to a profile used to support
reasonable suspicion.127 A direct interpretation of Rivera favors the line
of reasoning in Sokolow. 2 The argument would go as follows: Innocent factors taken in combination with other factors, including possibly

'20 See id. (pointing to improper order of questioning).
Trooper Cummings' questioning of Torres was not per se violative. Id. The trooper's observations were recognized as valid for a continuing suspicion, but not in the order they presented themselves
in these series of facts. Id. The act of observing others legitimately allows a practitioner
to surmise that police observations of innocuous circumstances, fitting a profile, could
lead to further questioning. Id.
12' Torres, 424 Mass. at 161, 674 N.E.2d at 643; Commonwealth v. Rivera, 33

Mass. App. Ct. 311, 314, 599 N.E.2d 245, 246 (1995).
'22See
Torres, 424 Mass. At 161,674 N.E.2d at 643 (quoting Rivera with language
not found in original opinion); Rivera, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 314, 599 N.E.2d at 245.
'23 Torres, 424 Mass. at 161, 674 N.E.2d at 643. This implies that non-suggestive,
or innocent, factors may not be added up. Id.
12 Rivera, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 314, 599 N.E.2d at 245.
121 See id. (discussing factors without use of "suggestive").
126

See Torres, 424 Mass. at 161, 674 N.E.2d at 643 (quoting suggestive factors can

be added up without actual reference to specific word). The foundation is that suggestive
factors can be added up, and the inference is that only suggestive factors may be added.
Id.
127
2

See id. (providing intended analysis of reasonable suspicion).
See Rivera, 33 Mass. App. Ct. at 314, 599 N.E.2d at 245 (textual reading sup-

ports use of non-suggestive factors to reach reasonable suspicion); United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989) (allowing for totality of circumstances argument to support reasonable suspicion to seize pursuant to profile). In Sokolow, the Court recognized
that innocent behavior will often be the foundation for further inquiry. Id. at 17.
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other innocent ones, may reach requisite reasonable suspicion. 129 There
is no explanation of the additional text in the opinion. 30 Unless the SJC
clarifies the use of the language, it appears that Torres could serve as the
basis to review an
officer's ability to add up non-suggestive factors on a
131
new set of facts.

III. ANALYSIS
The SJC, in Torres, intended to furnish Massachusetts citizens
with greater protection than provided for in the United States Constitution. 32 The SJC rejected the totality of the circumstances argument in
the Upton & Upton j1133 line of cases. 34 The SJC took great pains to
enforce a two-prong test promulgated through Aguilar v. Texas1 35 and
Spinnelli v. United States.136 By now making it more difficult for investigators, in state cases, to question suspected drug couriers in airports, the
'2 See generally Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 1 (allowing innocent factors to amount to
reasonable suspicion to seize pursuant to drug courier profile).

' See Torres, 424 Mass. 153, 674 N.E.2d 638 (noting word "suggestive" attributed to Rivera not found in opinion nor discussed text).
131 See id. (calling for use of suggestive factors in
reasonable suspicion).
32
1 See Torres, 424 Mass. 153, 674 N.E.2d 638 (limiting totality
analysis to include
at least some suspicious factors). The court stated that it was basing its opinion in express reliance on art. 14. Id. at 154, 67 N.E.2d at 640. See supra note 7 (outlining text of
Article 14).
394 Mass. 363, 476 N.E.2d 548 (1985)
See Commonwealth v. Upton, 390 Mass. 562, 458 N.E.2d 717. (1983) (discussing initial Upton case); Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. at 363, 476 N.E.2d at
548 (rejecting Supreme Court ruling in same case and defining new state constitutional
grounds). In Upton, the Court remanded a case for further ruling because the SJC had
not followed the federal guidelines in determining probable cause in the use of anonymous informants. In Upton !!, the SJC upheld its previous interpretation on independent
state grounds thus, establishing a different rule under state law. See supra notes 84-100
and accompanying text (discussing SIC distinguishable interpretation).
136 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
'3

1 34

" See generally id. at 108 (declaring importance of veracity and basis of knowledge factors); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410,411 (1969) (allowing for independent police corroboration of factors). For an arrest to comport with Article 14, information known to the arresting officers must satisfy a two-pronged test: first, a basis of
knowledge of the information provider - the particular means by which he came by the
information - must be shown; and second, facts establishing either the general veracity of
the informant or the specific reliability of his statement in the particular case. Upton,
394 Mass. at 363, 476 N.E.2d at 548.
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intent has had the opposite effect. 137 Like many other big cities to which
this criminal law theory applies, when state law has limited permissive
action, the state's law enforcement agencies look for alternative
methods. 38 It becomes obvious to law enforcement agencies that federal
law emerges as the least 3restrictive method, providing a wide scope of
subjective interpretation. 1
Massachusetts prosecutors and other law enforcement agencies
have not rushed to fight the Torres implications in airport drug courier
profile situations.14° This is somewhat due to the fact that the other major area of drug courier profile screening is on highways where the rules
of search and seizure have been historically broader.14 ' As the Supreme
Court sits to determine if it will place additional limits on motor vehicle
stops, Massachusetts prosecutors will watch carefully for any effect on
searches and seizures.142 If the Supreme Court places severe restrictions
on motor vehicle stops, it is likely that Torres will come under new scrutiny. 43 If the Supreme Court decides that searches following a motor
vehicle stop are no longer as heavily protected due to an inherent exigency argument of motor vehicles, then these searches will become more
See Torres, 424 Mass. 153, 674 N.E.2d 638 (calling for minimal independently
suspicious factors when grouping to reach reasonable suspicion). Torres requires each
observation to have suspicious characteristics whereas Sokolow allows all observations
to be bundled under a totality of the ci.,cumstances theory. Id.
17

' See Burnett, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 283, 283 (1995) (describing authorized police
program of completely random approaches to airport travelers).
' See generally Sokolow, 490 U.S. at I (allowing for compiling of otherwise innocent behaviors as factors in computing requisite reasonable suspicion).
"0 See Torres, 424 Mass. 153, 674 N.E.2d 638 (absence of other cases referring to
opinion). Research of Massachusetts cases since Torres indicates that there have been
few citations or references to Torres, and of those cases there are no negative references.
Id. The cases citing to Torres focus on the greater protections, provided by article 14, of
a passenger in a vehicle. Id. There are no references to the government's ability, or
inability, to draw inferences from non-suggestive factors. Id. There are no cases cited
dealing with airport drug courier profiles. Id.
...
See generally Commonwealth v. King, 389 Mass. 233, 237, 449 N.E.2d 1217,
1220 (1983) (recognizing several unique circumstances pertaining to Fourth Amendment
rights and automobile searches). See generally Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 376 Mass. 349,
355, 380 N.E.2d 669, 673 (1978) (recognizing broad searches of automobiles arising
under exigent circumstance not requiring warrant).
42
' See ASSOCIATED PRESS, Justices Question Searches By Police; An Iowa Case
Involves Authority After Citation, BOSTON GLOBE, November 4, 1998 at A3 (discussing
permissive scope, to searches incident to traffic citation currently under review by Supreme Court).
'
See id. (warning of potential change to permissive scope of automobile stops).
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difficult to justify.' 44 Prosecutors will justifiably seek to supplement an
officer's reasonable suspicion with additional factors like those found in
a drug courier profile. 145 It is ironic that the SJC's intent to protect its
citizens from the broad interpretations of federal law under the Fourth
Amendment could signal a return to federal prosecutions of Massachusetts' citizens, as a way of avoiding Massachusetts law.' 46

IV. PROPOSALS
There have been many commentaries against drug courier profile
use by academics and civil libertarians. 47 Some of these articles have
made recommendations and proposals on how to fix profile use. I4 For
example, opponents commonly offer to solidify the profile to a rigid set
of criteria.' 49 Such a proposal ignores the realities of drug dealing.150 If

'" See id. (predicting Supreme Court will likely restrict historically broad authority
to search); see also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925) (defining automobile exception to search warrant requirement).
'5 See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981) (recognizing sliding scale of
reasonable suspicion in light of officer's experience). A sharp prosecutor would ensure
that a very experienced officer were involved in as many airport drug courier profile
cases as possible. Id. In these circumstances, the more experienced the officer, the
fewer facts are necessary to justify a finding of reasonable suspicion. Id.
'4Compare Torres, 424 Mass. 153, 674 N.E.2d 638 (rejecting officer's ability to
add-up non-suggestive factors) with United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989)
(approving addition of non suggestive factors). The reasonable suspicion standard is
lower under a federal interpretation than in Massachusetts State courts. Id.
7
11 See Mark J. Kadish, The Drug CourierProfile:
in Planes, Trains, andAutomobiles; and Now in the Jury Box, 46 AM. U.L. REV. 747, 751 n.9 (criticizing profile use by
prosecutors who attempt to collaterally enter such observations as evidence). See supra
note 17 (proposing adherence to profile alone should be violative of Fourth Amendment). See generally Morgan Cloud, Search and Seizure by the Numbers: The Drug
CourierProfile and JudicialReview of Investigative Formulas,65 B.U.L. REV. 843
(1985) (calling for greater objective and detached review of Fourth Amendment
searches).
See Cloud, supra note
'4 See supra note 34 (calling for Camara balancing test).
130, at 850 (calling for independent judicial scrutiny of drug courier profiles).
49 See Cloud, supra note 147, at 850 (calling
for codified factors to allow for judicial review of compliance on each case). The author suggests the government should be
required to define all the elements of a drug courier profile before judicial acceptance as
the premise to an argument. Id.
"oSee Wilson, supra note 38, at 203 n. I (noting that profile must be flexible to be
useful). A rigid and well-publicized profile would disappear quickly from the drug cou-
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to bea profile were set in stone, it would not take long for drug dealers
51
activities.
their
modify
and
characteristics
come aware of the
Other proposals have suggested studies to corroborate officer's
suspicions with hard and clearly definable data. 52 In other words, their
proposals call for the identification of singular factors that make a profile
accurate and ask for a requirement to place a number on the percentage
of correct guesses officers tend to make. 53 Therefore, the profile would
have an objective reliability factor and courts would have a number on
which to give weight to its effectiveness.' 5 4 Government agencies have
done similar studies on airline hijackers in the 1960s and have successfully used such profiling to detect potential terrorists.155 Even though
helpful in those circumstances, there are significant differences between
the two types of activity. 56 Reliable and quick bomb detection equipment is still emerging as a technical capability available at airport passenger concourses in the United States.! 57 The new type of equipment is
more portable but expensive and currently only found in select locations
in a few national airports. 58
rier's modus operandi. Id. But see Karnes v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485, 489-90 (3d Cir.
1995) (recognizing profile changes as courier habits change).
161 See Skrutski, 62 F.3d at 489-90 (citing changing aspects of drug courier profile).
52
'
See Steven K. Bernstein, Supreme Court Review: Fourth Amendment - Using
the Drug Courier Profile to Fight the War on Drugs, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
996, 1016 (1989) (criticizing Sokolow for failing to require clearly defined set of permissible factors).
'6 See Wilson, supra note 38, at 238 (announcing "common criticism" that law enforcement officials do not use statistical analysis in profiles).
'" See generally United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (comparing
common sense deductions of behavior with unjustified need for objective data). The
Court granted certiorari to Sokolow specifically to reject the Ninth Circuit's two-part test
in determining reasonable suspicion. Id. The Supreme Court solidified the ability to
allow for common sense deductions. id.
'5See id. (citing FAA study of hijacking profiles).
See Hall, supra note 19 at 1031 (noting FAA profile is easier to regulate than
drug courier profile). Courts have provided a great deal of secrecy with the "skyjacker
profile," and often have revealed its details only in "in camera" hearings. Id. at 1010
(quoting United States v. Miller, 414 U.S. 1041 (1973) (cert. denied)).
'67 See Marci Bailey, Detecting a Trend Across the Globe; AS&E Detects Trend;
BOSTON GLOBE, March 29, 1998 at C4 (discussing emergence in 1998 of reliable hand
held detection equipment). The currently available equipment is expensive, not hand
held, more time consuming, and a greater invasion of privacy. id.
' See id. (noting new CargoSearch system at over $3 million each). Bailey further notes that these units are portable, but it appears that the operational focus of the
machine centers on border crossings as opposed to airports. Id.
'6
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Many bombs apparently can be made with a low probability of
setting off the walk-through metal detector. m59 The United States' culture
remains largely ignorant to the potential for a plane bombing while our
attention remains heightened to drug activity.'l ' Additionally, there are
many more instances of drug trafficking than terrorist bombings.' 6 ' For
these reasons, it seems that the terrorist profile has remained largely
fixed.' 62 Unfortunately, the same precepts do not apply to the drug courier.163
Finally, a proposal to conduct an empirical study ignores the important role that flexibility plays in a profile's usefulness. 164 The lucrative business of drug dealing makes it easy to hire and create camouflaged methods of delivery.' 65 For a profile to be useful, it must also be
flexible and adaptable to climate, location and culture. I6 Airline terrorists or hijackers tend to come from more limited and identifiable backgrounds.' 67 The two types of crimes have significant differences and to
force the drug courier to a hijacker's type definition ignores the foundation of adaptability that drug couriers rely upon)6
'" See Jerry Ackerman, Biopharmaceuticals:Therion Gets up to $25M to Develop
CancerVaccine; BOSTON GLOBE, January 18, 1998 at c4 (noting sale of expensive detection equipment to airports worldwide). The article suggests there is an emerging need
for new equipment with greater capabilities than widely available until now. Id.
'" See Hall, supra note 19, at 1010 at note 27 (highlighting in 1969 there were less
than 100 hijackings and attempts); Wilson, supra note 38, at 203 at note 1 (recognizing
drug epidemic leading up to and including 1978); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS

1994, at 413 (summa-

rizing billions of dollars spent as recently as 1995 fighting drugs). The war on drugs that
existed in the late 1960's continues to present day. Id.
'' See supra note 160 and accompanying text (comparing volume of drug cases to
vastly smaller hijacking attempts).
'62See Hall, supra note 19, at 1010 (noting succinct "skyjacker profile" with ob-

jective criteria).
"s See Wilson, supra note 38, at 233-34 (recognizing changing behaviors of drug
couriers and consequential flexible profile).
16 See id. (stressing law enforcement's position courier behaviors adapt). The profile must adapt to the activity it seeks to detect. Id.
'" See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,512 (1983) (declaring drug dealing so invasive that it amounts to pressing national concern).
'" See Wilson, supra note 38, at 233-34 (discerning adaptive drug courier profile
and corresponding need for law enforcement flexibility).
167 See Hall, supra note 19, at 1010 (discussing skyjacker profile and its time tested
criteria).
'" See Wilson, supra note 38, at 234 (noting important question is whether each
trait may distinguish courier from normal traveler).
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V. CONCLUSION
Drug courier profiles are greatly misunderstood. Once coined, a
phrase too often seems to take on monolithic proportions as to its meaning. Massachusetts seems to have fallen victim to this overstatement
when concluding that officers are not experts in drug activity observation. The conclusions that police should not disturb the citizenry absent
some objective manifestation of criminal suspicion is overbearing. By
basing its restrictive holdings exclusively on the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, the SJC seems to flatly reject that a whole can be greater
than the sum of its parts, and appears to create a totality of the suspicious
circumstances test.
It is not a leap of logic to say that people commonly judge a
whole to be greater than the sum of its parts. Allowing trained police
officers to add up apparently innocent behaviors and physical attributes
to reach a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity does not constitute an
overbearing intrusion on personal freedoms. The SJC has signaled otherwise, although it has permitted common sense judgments in making
determinations about an individual's conduct. Calling a process of deducing common sense observations a drug courier profile taints the actual process with fears of casting too wide a net on innocent people.
When trained police officers use factors they have seen repeatedly
in actual couriers, it should not be illegal to stop a person who displays
these time-tested characteristics to ask a few simple questions. Citizens
have a recognized right to refuse, and the innocent will be on their way
in a matter of moments. If answers are inconsistent, then the legal stepping stones of reasonable suspicion and probable cause can be climbed in
due course. Given the high priority placed on drug interdiction by society, this is the least intrusive means that still satisfies our need to achieve
an ordered society.
In a culture plagued by drugs, it is sound public policy for police
to use honest effective methods to deter illegal activity. The drug courier
profile is a tool to help this process. When used as a tool, and not a
crutch, it is an effective piece of drug prosecutions. By allowing a
proven method of reducing the chances of even questioning an innocent
person, Massachusetts will continue to protect the innocent. Both the
prosecutor and defense attorney continue to have many opportunities to
question and impeach individual officers as to their conclusions of an

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. V

individual's behavior and root out any hasty or ill-conceived foundations
for seizures.
The narcotics officer of today is a well-trained professional. A
fact that has resulted in thousands more criminals being prosecuted for
drug courier activities. The additional data and collective experience
gained by police have solidified the profile's foundation. Even without
scientific testing, many profile characteristics have remained the same.
With an apparent misinterpretation of the Rivera opinion, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has, at least, left itself open for
another opportunity to state its intent. If the United States Supreme
Court forces another opportunity to bring an appeal to the SJC by modifying motor vehicle stops, we will likely see another chance for weighing
the airport drug courier profile's permissibility in Massachusetts. It may,
however, provide nothing more than a chance to close the Torres door
even tighter.
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